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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Some statutes creating juvenile courts have been held invalid because the
jurisdiction had been conferred on courts or officers whose powers were so
limited by the constitution of the state as to exclude the exercise of the in-
tended powers." Section 103 of the North Dakota Constitution which defines
the jurisdiction of the District Courts also limits that jurisdiction as provided
elsewhere in the Constitution. Section 113 gives to police magistrates juris-
diction over all cases arising under city ordinances and this would appear to
be a limitation on the jurisdiction of the District courts. The dissenting
judges in the instant case so considered it.12
The contention of the majority in the instant case was that a municipality,
being a creature of the state, has only those powers granted to it by the legis-
lature. But the legislature, in passing the juvenile court act, limited the opera-
tion of municipal ordinances and not the jurisdiction of city magistrates to
hear cases arising under those ordinances. Thus the majority circumvented
what appeared to be a conflict between a statute and a constitutional pro-
vision. This reasoning appears to give the legislature the indirect power to
sharply curtail the constitutionally granted jurisdiction of city magistrates.
Thus while the majority have undoubtedly reached a socially desirable
result the reasoning of the minority seems more in keeping with strict legal
interpretation.
JAMES A. MURRAY.
LIENS - RELATIVE PRIORITY OF FEDERAL AND MUNICIPAL STATUTORY LIENS.
-Two mortgages on the real property of a corporation were foreclosed by
judgment sale and the gross sum realized was $27,071.34. Against this fund
were $31,000 in claims, including expenses of the sale, the two mortgages, a
judgment of record, a federal statutory lien and a municipal statutory lien.
Following a Connecticut statute providing that real estate tax liens shall take
precedence over all transfers and encumbrances in any manner affecting the
property subject to the lien,' the-Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
affirmed2 the lower court's determination that the claims should be paid in
the following order: the expenses, the city's liens, the mortgages, the judg-
ment lien and the federal lien. The United States appealed ,the decision on
the ground that the city's liens should not have been given priority over
the federal liens. On certiorari the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the judgment be vacated. The relative priority of the federal and muni-
cipal claims should be determined by the principle, "first in time is first in
right." United States v. City of New Britain, Conn., 74 S.Ct. 367 (1954).
Priority of federal tax liens over other liens and encumbrances is governed
by § 3466 of the Revised Statutes3 and §§3670-2 of the Internal Revenue
11. State v. Tincher, 258 Mo. 1, 166 S.W. 1028 (1914); Pugh v. Bowden, 54 Fla.
302, 45 So. 499 (1907); Hunt v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 142 Mich. 93, 105 N.W. 531
(1905).
12. See State ex rel City of Minot v. Gronna, 59 N.W.2d 514, 541 (N.D. 1953)
(dissenting opinion).
1. Conn. Gen. Stat. 1949, c. 88, §1853.
2. Brown v. General Laundry Service, Inc., 139 Conn. 363, 94 A.2d 10 (1952).
3. Rev. Stat. §3466, 31 U.S.C. §191 (1946). "'Whenever any person indebted to
the United States is insolvent . . . the debts due to the United States shal be first
satisfied . . ."
RECENT CASES 153
Code.4 Section 3466 provides for an "absolute" priority 5 of federal claims
where the debtor is insolvent, while §§3670-2 provide for the establish-
ment of the federal lien, period of the lien, and validity against certain classes
of creditors.6 There is no schedule of priority, as such, set forth in §§
3670-2. 7 The Connecticut Court anticipated the Supreme Court's result, as
stated above, when it considered the facts as governed by §§3670 and
3671 alone,8 but concluded that when § 3672 was applied a different
result ensued. This conclusion was reached via the assumption that if the
mortgagee paid the municipal taxes (as was permitted by a Connecticut
statute)O the amount paid would become part of the privileged mortgage
debt and receive priority as such over the federal lien.1° As a result, accord-
ing to the Connecticut Court, the priority of such municipal taxes would depend
on the election of the mortgagee to pay the taxes, and this would lead to an
anomalous situation" which could not have been intended by Congress. It
was therefore argued that Congress intended the federal liens to rank behind
those statutory liens which could enjoy priority over the privileged encumb-
rances.
In disposing of the Connecticut Court's theory, the Supreme Court deftly
avoided any involvement in the problem of circuity of priority by simply
stating that the United States is not interested in whether the State receives
its revenue prior to other creditors even where the other creditors are privileg-
ed under §3672. "That is a matter of state law."' The United States, then,
is to be paid from any funds in excess of the amount necessary to pay the
privileged creditors. The court summed it up by saying that there is nothing
to show that Congress intended antecedent federal tax liens to rank behind
any interests except those specifically set out in §3672.
The result here seems in accord with the theory of federal tax preference
over state or municipal taxes because of wider public interest.' 3 The result
also seems equitable in view of the cases holding that a state cannot impair
the standing of federal liens without the consent of Congress.' 4
4. Int. Rev. Code §§3670-2.
5. The "absolute" portion is subject to conjecture in view of the instant decision.
6. Int. Rev. Code §3670 provides. "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or
refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the
United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belong-
ing to such person." §3671 provides, "Unless another date is specifically fixed by law,
the lien shall arise at the time the assessment list was received by the collector and shall
continue until the liability for such amount is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by
reason of lapse of time." §3672 provides, "Such lien shall not be valid as against any
mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed
by the collector . . . in accordance with the law of the State or Territory in which the
property subject to the lien is situated . . .; or in the office of the clerk of the United
States district court for the judicial district in which the property subject to the lien is
situated .... ;or in the office of the clerk of* the District Court of the United States for
the District of Columbia . ...
7. United States v. City of New Britain, Conn., 74 S.Ct. 367, 370 (1954).
8. Brown v. General Laundry Service, Inc., 139 Conn. 363, 94 A.2d 10, 14 (1952).
9. Conn. Gen. Stat. 1949, c. 361, §7192.
10. But see Anderson, Federal Tax Liens-Their Nature and Priority, 41 Calif. L. Rev.
241 (1953). "Even if the mortgagee has in fact paid the local lien, he is not by that
fact alone entitled to priority over the federal lien; the mortgagee has merely made a
subsequent advance, which may or may not be entitled to the priority of the original debt."
11. See Board of Supr's. of L.S.U. v. Hart, 210 La. 78, 26 So.2d 361, 366 (1946).
12. United States v. City of New Britain, Conn., 74 S.Ct. 367, 372 (1954).
13. See Sarner, Correlation of Priority and Lien Rights in the Collection of Federal
Taxes, 95 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 739, 746 (1947).
1.4. Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338 (1943); United States v. Snyder, 149
U.S. 210 (1893).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The Connecticut Court, in its adjudication of the case, dealt with the
municipal liens as being specific and perfected. 1 5 This characterization by a
state is not conclusive against the federal government, 16 but the Supreme
Court in the instant case accepted the state court's holding as to the specifi-
city of the liens, since they attached to specific pieces of real property for the
taxes assessed. The court also stated that the liens were perfected in that
there was nothing more to be done to have a choate lien.'- The liens of the
United States' were held to be general and perfected- s but the fact that the
federal liens were general and the city's liens specific will not give the city
priority.1 9
Thus priority, the Supreme Court concluded, should be determined by the
principle, "First in time is first in right,"20 since the competing liens- were
equal in stature.
The acceptance of the city's liens as meeting the requirements of specifi-
city and perfection is worthy of note.2' The Supreme Court had heretofore
assiduously avoided answering any question of priority until their require-
ments had been met,2 2 and their refusal has engendered a great deal of legal
opinion as well as some conjectural solutions, 2 with the liens in the instant
case admittedly specific and perfected and requiring the priority as set forth
by the court, it would seem that the same requirements and priority would
govern where the taxpayer was insolvent and within §3466.24 At any rate, if
the taxpayer in the instant case were insolvent, the court would, it is assumed,
still consider the liens of the city as specific and perfected. As such their
priority against the federal liens would, of necessity, be determined, and that
determination might well be the same as in the instant case.
Louis R. MOORE.
15. Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946) (The long established rule requires
that the lien must be definite, and not merely ascertainable in the future by taking further
steps, in at least three respects as of the crucial time. These are: (1) The identity of
the lienor; (2) The amount of the lien; and (3) The property to which it attaches);
United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274 (1940).
16. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950); United States
v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn Co., 323 U.S. 353 (1944).
17. United States v. City of New Britain, Conn., 74 S.Ct. 367, 369 (1954
when the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the
lien are established."
18. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 107 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939);
United States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731 (1946) (Where liens were considered by the
court to be specific and perfected).
19. United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F.2d 963, 965 (4th Cir. 1941) (A lien
is not deprived of validity because it attaches to a number of pieces of property instead
of to a single piece, nor is it for that reason to be subordinated to a junior lien at-
taching to a single piece of property. When properly perfected, the lien under the
statute constitutes a charge upon specific property of the taxpayer for the satisfaction of
which that property may be sold.)
20. United States v. City of New Britain, Conn., 74 S.Ct. 367, 370 (1954). See
Rankin v. Scott, 12 Wheat. 177 (U.S. 1827).
21. See the discussion of liens in Thelusson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396 (U.S. 1817);
also Clark, Federal Tax liens And Their Enforcement, 33 Va. L. Rev. 13.
22. Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946); United States v. Waddill, Holland &
Flinn Co., 323 U.S. 353 (1945); United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941); United
States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936); New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290 (1933);
Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1921).
23. See United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn Co. supra note 22; United States
v. City of Greenville, 118 F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1941); Anderson, Federal Tax Liens-
Their Nature and Priority, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 241 (1953); Clark, Federal Tax Liens And
Their Enforcement, 33 Va. L. Rev. 13 (1947).
24. Cf. United States v. Woodroof, 253 Ala. 620, 46 S.2d 553, 561 (1950)- "We
feel jutified, therefore, in acting of the assumption that it would hold that the priority
set up in §3466 would not supersede a lien which was specific and perfected at the time
when the receiver was appointed."
